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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed whether a 
Minnesota statute authorizing law enforcement to stop motorists based 
solely on the presence of special license plates issued primarily to repeat 
drunken drivers is proper under the United States and Minnesota 
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Constitutions.  In State v. Henning,1 the court held the statute 
unconstitutional by a 4-3 decision.  Finding no persuasive reason to do 
otherwise, the court struck down the legislature’s attempt to eliminate the 
requirement that law enforcement have “reasonable articulable 
suspicion” to conduct an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle. 
This article provides a brief survey of similar laws in other states 
that require offenders to visually inform the police and public that they 
have been convicted of drunken driving or other crimes—a requirement 
reminiscent of centuries-old “scarlet letter” sentencing.2  The article then 
explains two constitutional issues key to the Henning decision: the 
United States Supreme Court’s “reasonable articulable suspicion” 
standard and its erosion, and the Minnesota Constitution’s strong 
protections against “seizure.”3  Next, the article traces the history and 
holding of the Henning case and focuses on the statutes involved.4  
Finally, the article critiques the Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion and dissent, noting that while the court has outlawed traffic stops 
based solely on special “WX,” “WY,” or “WZ” license plates, police are 
likely to receive the benefit of the doubt as long as they can provide any 
reasonable reason for the stop.5 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  “Scarlet Letter” Sentencing and Efforts to Control Drunken 
Driving 
The death toll from drunken driving is an undeniable tragedy, 
evidenced by data showing that more than one-third of traffic fatalities 
can be blamed on alcohol-related crashes.6  Repeat drunken drivers are a 
chief concern.  Nearly half of Minnesota’s 30,000 driving-while-
intoxicated (“DWI”) arrests each year involve drivers with prior DWI 
convictions.7 
 
 1. 666 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2003). 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. See infra Part II.B. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. In 2002, 41% of the 42,815 U.S. traffic fatalities were attributed to crashes 
involving alcohol. In Minnesota, the figure was 39%. See MADD Stats & Resources, at 
http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1112,00.html (citing National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration data) (last visited Dec. 7, 2003). 
 7. Jim Cleary, Controlling Repeat DWI Offenders with Staggered Sentencing, 
Information Brief, Minnesota House of Representatives (January 2003), at 3, available at 
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The Minnesota Legislature has tried many initiatives to reduce DWI 
recidivism.  So-called “staggered sentencing” was one response.8  The 
state’s new “felony DWI” law, which took effect August 1, 2002, was 
another.9  These efforts have had their moments in the public spotlight—
the felony DWI standard in particular.  Against this high-profile 
backdrop, for several decades a Minnesota statute has directed that the 
license plates attached to cars registered to repeat drunken drivers be 
impounded and “special series plates” be issued in their place so that law 
enforcement can readily identify repeat offenders on the road.10  
Typically the plates begin with the letters “WX,” “WY,” or “WZ,” and 
while only police are trained to look for the plates, anyone 
knowledgeable about the law can learn to spot cars registered to people 
likely convicted of drunken driving. 
Minnesota is among a handful of states with such laws.  Iowa, Ohio, 
Oregon, and Washington have experimented with measures that alter the 
license plates of repeat drunken drivers.11  Massachusetts has toyed with 
requiring repeat offenders to display license plates reading “Twice 
Convicted of Operating Under the Influence.”12  For several years Ohio 
has required repeat drunken drivers to operate vehicles displaying license 
plates of a different color and with special serial numbers.13  That state is 
beefing up its law as of January 1, 2004, by requiring drivers who 
operate vehicles with license plates from other states to display a special 
decal on the bottom left corner of the vehicle’s back window.14 
While the license-plate laws are chiefly designed to catch police 
officers’ attention, they also are reminiscent of “scarlet letter 
sentencing,” a centuries-old idea of requiring repeat offenders to visually 
 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/stagsent.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2003). 
 8. Id. at 5 (explaining that staggered sentencing involves splitting up a defendant’s 
sentence among several shorter terms). 
 9. MINN. STAT. § 169A.24 (2002). 
 10. MINN. STAT. § 168.041 (2002). 
 11. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle and License Plate 
Sanctions, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/outreach/safesobr/19qp/factsheets/vehicle. 
html (last visited Dec. 7, 2003). 
 12. Ellen J. Silberman, Scarlet Letter Plates Sought for Drunken Drivers, BOSTON 
HERALD, May 24, 2001, at 19. 
 13. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4503.231 (West 1999). 
 14. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4503.231(B)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).  The 
change in Ohio, effective Jan. 1, 2004, also permits motorists with limited driving 
privileges to operate an employer’s vehicle that lacks the special plates as long as the 
employer knows about the employee’s past. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4503.231(B)(1) 
(West 2003). 
3
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inform others of their questionable past.15  Scarlet letter sentencing 
springs from legislative and judicial frustration with the failure of 
traditional methods of sentencing.16  However, it also adds “shaming” to 
the criminal law tenets of incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and 
deterrence, or at least alters the retribution tenet in a sometimes 
controversial and perhaps unconstitutional way. 
The revival of shaming springs from profound and widespread 
dissatisfaction with existing methods of punishment. In 
particular, many people, including judges, doubt the 
effectiveness and humanity of prison.  Yet, the main alternative 
to prison—parole—is equally unattractive, both because the 
community fears the often unmonitored return of the offender 
to its neighborhoods, and because most people believe 
criminals should not go unpunished.17 
Scarlet letter sentencing results from legislative as well as judicial 
innovations.18  Sometimes an individual judge’s creativity sets off well-
publicized tussles between branches of government or levels of the 
judiciary.  For example, in 1991 a New York judge required a driver with 
six drunken-driving convictions to affix a fluorescent sign reading 
“convicted DWI” on the license plate of any car he might drive.19  New 
York’s highest court struck down the sentence because it was not 
reasonably related to the driver’s rehabilitation and was deemed outside a 
court’s authority.20  A commentator, meanwhile, urged that the appellate 
court’s holding be construed narrowly so judicial creativity could be 
maintained.21 
 
 15. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).  
Hawthorne’s masterpiece, set in Puritan New England, tells the story of Hester Prynne, 
who bore an illegitimate child and was forced to wear an “A” for “adultery” on her 
clothing.  The book, long in the public domain, is available online at 
http://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Nathaniel_Hawthorne/The_Scarlet_Letter (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2003). 
 16. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 1880, 1882-84 (1991). 
 17. Id. at 1884-85. 
 18. Id. at 1882.  For example, Nevada has allowed drunken drivers to bypass 
incarceration if they perform community service while dressed in clothing that identifies 
them as drunken drivers. In 1989, a Rhode Island judge required a defendant to place a 
newspaper advertisement with his picture and words identifying himself as a child 
molester. 
 19. People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Dana Wordes, Recent Development, Penal Law Section 65.10: New York Court 
of Appeals Holds That Probation Condition Requiring “CONVICTED DWI” Sign on 
License Plate Was Penalty Not Reasonably Related to Probation, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
4
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Scarlet letter sentencing has its place, advocates say, because it 
encourages repeat offenders to obey the law and also warns the public 
that a repeat offender is nearby.22  It has its detractors, as well.  For 
instance, an official from the Massachusetts American Civil Liberties 
Union chapter described that state’s proposed DWI license-plate measure 
as “sort of like the public pillory on Boston Common.”23 
B.  History of the “Reasonable Articulable Suspicion” Standard 
1.   The United States Supreme Court sets the “Reasonable 
Articulable Suspicion” Standard 
Apart from the collateral issues of shame and scarlet letter 
sentencing is what legislators say is the chief goal of issuing special 
license plates for cars registered to repeat drunken drivers: allowing 
police officers to easily identify motorists with questionable pasts.  When 
police spot a motorist driving a vehicle with the special plates, they are 
encouraged to keep careful watch—or, in Minnesota’s case, permit 
officers to pull over the driver, regardless of whether the officer 
suspected any wrongdoing was afoot and even though the driver may 
never have been convicted of a crime. 
When a motorist is stopped, that constitutes a “seizure,” which, 
according to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
must be reasonable.  Specifically, the Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.24 
 
421, 433 (1996). 
 22. See, e.g., Barbara Clare Morton, Note, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and 
into the Light—“Scarlet Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern 
America Because It Deprives Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 100-01 
(arguing that violating a repeat offender’s privacy “can successfully rehabilitate and deter 
some offenders and would-be criminals”).  See also Road Warrior, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & 
LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Sept. 18, 2002, at B5 (including a letter from a newspaper 
reader suggesting that Virginia replicate Minnesota’s law requiring repeat DWI offenders 
to display special license plates.  The reader wrote: “If nothing else, it would warn us to 
be extra vigilant when we encounter a car with such a plate.”). 
 23. Silberman, supra note 12. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Until 1968, when the United States Supreme Court decided Terry v. 
Ohio,25 the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s probable 
cause provision literally, holding that for a seizure to be lawful, probable 
cause had to be present.26  In Terry, however, the Court distinguished 
between an arrest and an investigatory stop, holding that the latter 
required only a reasonable articulable suspicion rather than probable 
cause. 
In Terry, an experienced officer was on routine patrol when he 
spotted two individuals standing on a street corner.27  The officer 
observed these men taking turns pacing in front of and peering through a 
store window five or six times each.28  Based on his prior experience in 
this particular neighborhood, the officer determined that this activity was 
typical of “casing a job” for robbery.29  The officer then approached the 
men, identified himself as a police officer and performed a “pat down” of 
the men’s outer clothing.  During this limited pat down, the officer 
discovered guns in the men’s pockets.30  The men were arrested.31  
During their case, the men sought to have the guns suppressed, arguing 
that this search and seizure was unreasonable because it was not based on 
probable cause.32 
In determining whether the seizure and search was reasonable, the 
Terry Court engaged in a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the officer’s 
actions were justified, and (2) whether these actions were reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference.33  
The Court focused on balancing the government’s need to search or seize 
against the invasion of the individual.34  In order to justify such an 
intrusion, the Court held that the officer would need to point to “specific 
and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”35 
Requiring the officer to point to these specific facts allows a judge to 
objectively look at the facts to determine reasonability and lawfulness. 
The Court further examined the government’s interest in keeping 
officers and the public safe.  The Court reasoned that an arrest is “wholly 
 
 25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-57 (1967). 
 27. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. 
 28. Id. at 6. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 7. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 7-8. 
 33. Id. at 19-20. 
 34. Id. at 20-21. 
 35. Id. at 21. 
6
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different” from a limited search where an “officer observes unusual 
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with 
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . .  [he may] 
conduct a carefully limited search . . . .”36  The standard announced in 
Terry later became known as the “reasonable articulable suspicion” 
standard. 
Gradually, the Supreme Court began to use the “reasonable 
articulable suspicion” standard in analyzing situations other than limited 
pat down searches of a person.  For example, the Court used this 
standard in analyzing motor vehicles stops.37  Eventually, the Court went 
even further, holding that under some circumstances, the government 
need not even have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a motor 
vehicle.38 
These decisions balanced the government’s interest in stopping 
criminal activity against the privacy rights of a citizen.39  For example, in 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,40 the Court addressed 
whether law enforcement may use roadblocks to stop and investigate all 
drivers in order to arrest those who are impaired by alcohol.  By stopping 
every motorist who reached a roadblock, law enforcement could not state 
a reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. The Court’s opinion 
explained that a “seizure” occurs under the Fourth Amendment when a 
vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.41  In determining that the seizure was 
reasonable under the facts of the case, the Court held that “the balance of 
the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this 
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of 
intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in 
favor of the state program.”42 
2.  The Minnesota Constitution affords more protection than the 
United States Constitution: State v. Ascher 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken an approach different from 
 
 36. Id. at 30. 
 37. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 38. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border patrol’s 
routine of stopping vehicles at checkpoints located on major highway to check for illegal 
aliens absent reasonable articulable suspicion did not violate Fourth Amendment). 
 39. See id. at 560. 
 40. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 41. Id. at 450. 
 42. Id. at 455. 
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the United States Supreme Court in analyzing its citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights while in motor vehicles.  In Ascher v. Commissioner 
of Public Safety,43 the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the 
Minnesota Constitution more broadly than the federal Constitution. 
Ascher involved a state and local sobriety roadblock.  The 
Burnsville Police Department, along with the Minnesota State Patrol, set 
up a roadblock stopping all vehicles in an attempt to catch alcohol-
impaired drivers.44  The officers briefly detained each driver and directed 
those believed to be under the influence to a “final screen” area.45  The 
State Patrol notified the media of the roadblock, and news crews set up 
cameras in the final screen area.46  After being directed to this area, 
Ricky Ascher, a driver, was required to undergo field sobriety tests and 
take a preliminary breath test.47  Ascher was subsequently arrested and 
charged with refusal to submit to chemical testing.48  In total, only 2.3% 
of those stopped at the roadblock were arrested for some type of 
offense.49 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that when law enforcement uses 
roadblocks to stop drivers to investigate and arrest those who are 
impaired by alcohol, the police violate Article I, Section 10 of the 
Minnesota State Constitution.50  The court explained that the Minnesota 
Constitution requires police to have an objective individualized 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop a driver.51  The court 
further held that the state had not proven there was any reason to 
dispense with this rule.  In the interest of protecting the public from 
intrusive procedures, the court held the statute unconstitutional.52 
Suspicionless stops surfaced again a year later in the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.  In State v. Greyeagle,53 the appeals court addressed 
whether a police officer could stop a vehicle based solely on the fact that 
the vehicle bore special series license plates issued to those with repeated 
driving violations, including drunken driving.  In that case, a state 
trooper stopped a motorist based on the trooper’s routine practice of 
 
 43. 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994). 
 44. Id. at 184. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 187. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 541 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
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stopping all vehicles with such special registration license plates.54  
These plates were made available to “drivers or owners of cars whose 
regular plates have been impounded because of driving violations.”55  A 
person could obtain the special plates if he or she showed that there was 
another licensed driver who was still legally entitled to drive the 
vehicle.56 
The court of appeals held that the police may not make 
suspicionless stops of drivers based solely on special series registration 
plates, where the statute creating such plates does not provide that the 
plates are issued under a condition of having to be routinely stopped.57  
The court also determined that where the state produced no evidence that 
suspicionless stops are any more effective than the traditional stops based 
on particular suspicion, the routine stop of special series registration 
vehicles is unconstitutional.58 
In apparent response to Greyeagle,59 the Legislature passed 
Minnesota Statutes section 168.0422, which permitted police to pull over 
drivers displaying special series plates “for the purpose of determining 
whether the driver is operating the vehicle lawfully under a valid driver’s 
license.”60 
In State v. Baumann, a 2000 case involving section 168.0422, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a traffic stop of a motorist bearing 
the plates, but did so without reaching the constitutional issues.61  
However, a sharply worded concurrence from Judge Randall, 
reminiscent of criticisms involving scarlet letter sentencing, urged that 
the underlying statute’s constitutionality must be considered: 
Minn. Stat. § 168.0422 is a statute authorizing a “mark” or 
“brand” to be placed on a citizen’s vehicle license plate.  That 
mark labels that vehicle’s driver as one who can be stopped, 
not for articulable suspicion of criminal activities, but rather 
because of the “mark.”  That is impermissible . . . . You might 
as well make the mark a pink triangle or some other identifying 
object.  The results are exactly the same.62 
 
 54. Id. at 327. 
 55. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 168.041, subd. 6; 168.042, subd. 12 (1994)). 
 56. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d at 327. 
 57. Id. at 328, 330. 
 58. Id. at 329. 
 59. State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Minn. 2003). 
 60. MINN. STAT. § 168.0422 (2002). 
 61. State v. Baumann, 616 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (review denied 
Minn. Nov. 15, 2000). 
 62. Id. at 778. 
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Finally, in 2003, the constitutionality of traffic stops based solely on 
Minnesota Statutes section 168.0422 was decided in State v. Henning. 
III.  STATE V. HENNING 
A.  The Facts, Statutes, and Initial Appeal 
Joel Henning, the driver in State v. Henning, received special series 
“WZ” license plates after his vehicles were impounded because of two 
previous “driving while impaired” convictions. 63  Pursuant to Minnesota 
law, Henning’s father requested special series plates after demonstrating 
to the court that he was the owner of the vehicle and had a valid driver’s 
license.64  Specifically, Minnesota Statutes section 168.041, subdivision 
6, allows special series license plates to be issued:  
If a member of the violator’s household has a valid driver’s 
license, the violator or owner has a limited license issued under 
section 171.30, or the owner is not the violator and the owner 
has a valid or limited license or a member of the owner’s 
household has a valid driver’s license.65 
On July 12, 2000, an Olmsted County deputy noticed Henning’s 
vehicle bearing the “WZ” plates.66  The deputy followed the vehicle but 
did not notice any inappropriate driving conduct or any driving 
violations.67  The deputy stopped the vehicle,68  later testifying that the 
only reason he stopped Henning’s vehicle was because the vehicle 
displayed special series plates.69 
Joel Henning told the deputy he knew he could be stopped based on 
the special series license plates, but he also expressed belief that the 
deputy needed an additional reason to stop him.70  Henning had no valid 
driver’s license at the time of the stop because his license had been 
revoked.71  The deputy cited Henning for driving after revocation, having 
no driver’s license in his possession, and having no proof of insurance.72 
 
 63. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 381-82. 
 64. Id. at 387 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 383. 
 66. Id. at 381. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 382. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
10
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Henning challenged the stop at an omnibus hearing in Olmsted 
County District Court.73  Henning argued that section 168.0422 of the 
Minnesota Statutes was unconstitutional.74  At the hearing, the deputy 
admitted that the special series license plates were the only reason he 
stopped the vehicle.75  The district court held the statute unconstitutional 
but found that special series license plates gave the deputy “reasonable 
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop.”76  
Henning was convicted of driving after revocation and driving without a 
valid driver’s license in his possession.77 
Henning appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the convictions and held the statute constitutional.78  The 
appeals court held that Henning implicitly submitted to routine police 
stops by applying for and displaying special series license plates.79  The 
court explained that “[b]y applying for and displaying those plates, 
appellant submitted to routine police stops of his vehicle; he told the 
deputy that he knew he could be stopped because of the plates.”80  The 
court noted that even if Henning had not known, he would be deemed to 
have submitted since citizens are presumed to know the law.81 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals analogized Henning’s situation to 
that in which a driver consents to tests for purposes of determining the 
presence of alcohol, controlled substance, or hazardous substances 
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 169.123, subdivision 2(a).82  The 
court of appeals explained that: 
If operating motor vehicles within the state legally implies a 
driver’s consent to blood, breath, or urine testing for a 
particular purpose, it is reasonable to infer that utilization of 
special series license plates likewise may legally imply the 
driver’s consent to stops of the vehicle for a particular 
purpose.83   
However, the testing conducted to determine whether a driver is 
 
 73. State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 74. Id. 
 75. State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 2003). 
 76. State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 504 
 79. Id. at 502. 
 80. Id. at 502. 
 81. Id. at 502 n.1. 
 82. Id. at 502. 
 83. Id. 
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impaired takes place only after an officer already has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and probable cause to arrest the 
suspect.  In such a case, an officer would have specific justification for 
believing that the driver was impaired.  An officer cannot simply pull 
over a driver and require the person to submit to a test. 
Henning petitioned to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari. 
B.   In the Minnesota Supreme Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held section 168.0422 
unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.84 
Pursuant to Delaware v. Prouse,85 stopping a motor vehicle to 
check whether the driver is properly licensed is a seizure and is not 
permitted under the Fourth Amendment without reasonable articulable 
suspicion.86  However, the state argued that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy because Henning applied for and received the 
special series license plates, and that by doing so he was aware that his 
use of the vehicle gave police authority to stop vehicles with such license 
plates without reasonable articulable suspicion.87  The Minnesota Court 
of Appeals relied on that argument in upholding the statute’s 
constitutionality; however, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this 
analysis. 88  
As the court explained, the facts did not establish that Henning had 
a subjective belief that he could be pulled over solely because of the 
special license plates.89  More importantly, because the state 
contemplated that Henning’s father might apply for and receive the 
special license plates, the state knew that someone other than Henning—
someone with a valid driver’s license—might be driving the vehicle.  To 
obtain the special plates, one must show that the person who will be 
driving the vehicle will be doing so legally.  That driver might be a 
violator with a temporary license, or it might be someone never 
convicted of a crime.  As the supreme court correctly pointed out, 
“[t]hus, Minn. Stat. § 168.0422 subjects a number of licensed motorists, 
 
 84. State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 2003). 
 85. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 86. Henning, 666 N.W.2d at 383. 
 87. Id. at 383-84. 
 88. State v. Henning, 644 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 89. State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 2003). 
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who were not a party to the original revocation of the registration plates 
or the subsequent reissuing of the special series plates, to the possibility 
of being stopped by every law enforcement officer they encounter.”90  
The court subsequently discredited the state’s assertion that Henning had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy and that this “fact” justified a 
suspicionless stop.91 
The court then examined whether Henning’s stop was reasonable.  
If there was no reasonable articulable suspicion, the state must provide a 
persuasive reason for dispensing with the general requirement of 
individualized suspicion.92  Citing Prouse, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
explained, “[w]here individualized suspicion is not required to make a 
stop, other safeguards are relied upon to assure that a driver’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy may not be invaded at the discretion of a 
patrolling officer.”93  The court further explained, “[t]he degree of the 
intrusion must be weighed against the promotion of legitimate 
government interests.”94  The court noted that legal drivers with special 
series license plates would be subject to repeated stops at the unchecked 
discretion of law enforcement.95  The court concluded that the state had 
not met its burden of articulating its persuasive reason for dispensing 
with the general requirement of individualized suspicion.96 
Justice Meyer wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by 
Chief Justice Blatz and Justice Hanson.  The dissent based its opinion on 
balancing competing interests: (1) the gravity of the public concern 
served by the seizure, (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and (3) the severity of the interference with individual 
liberty.97  The dissent pointed out that with respect to the first factor, the 
state has a substantial interest in keeping roads safe.98  With respect to 
the second factor, the dissent noted that “[v]iolators whose license plates 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. The court discredited the district court’s ruling that there existed reasonable 
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle.  Applying a totality of the circumstances 
analysis, the court correctly pointed out that the special series license plates are issued 
only when it is shown that the vehicle may be legally driven.  Thus, the mere presence of 
such plates could not constitute reasonable articulable suspicion.  Id. at 384-85. 
 92. Id. at 385 (quoting Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 
(Minn. 1994)). 
 93. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)). 
 94. Id. at 384 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)). 
 95. Id. at 385. 
 96. Id. at 386. 
 97. Id. at 387 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 388. 
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were impounded by the arresting officer showed a 50 percent decrease in 
recidivism over a 2-year period . . . .”99  With regard to the third factor, 
the dissent claimed that the stops involve a narrow class of persons and 
that these stops would be limited and brief.100 
In responding to these points, the majority agreed that the state has a 
legitimate interest in keeping drunken drivers off the road.101  As the 
court pointed out, however, “[t]he state has not met its burden of 
showing that it is impracticable for police to develop individualized 
suspicion and that a departure from the individualized suspicion 
requirement will significantly help police achieve a higher rate of arrest 
than would using more conventional means of apprehending alcohol 
impaired drivers.”102  Although the practice of impounding license plates 
may further the state’s interest in protecting the public, the court 
explained, the subsequent issuance of special plates to allow the vehicle 
to be driven by a legal driver does not necessarily further the state’s 
interests in protecting the public.103 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s firm position that suspicionless 
stops of motorists are improper can be cast in terms heard frequently at 
the United States Supreme Court during Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
reign: the ends do not justify the means. 
Clearly the Ascher and Henning decisions put the burden squarely 
on Minnesota law enforcement to show that there is a legitimate and 
specific reason to stop a motor vehicle.  While the public interest in 
curbing drunken drivers in general, and repeat offenders in particular, is 
a vital public interest and a vexing problem, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has unequivocally mandated that motorists must be observed doing 
something wrong before a traffic stop may commence. 
The Henning decision stands apart from recent decisions in 
neighboring jurisdictions that involved questionable traffic stops 
involving license plates.  In Iowa this year, a police officer’s mistaken 
stop was forgiven after he initially thought a driver was operating a 
vehicle lacking a rear license plate but then saw the temporary paper card 
 
 99. Id. at 389. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 386. 
 102. Id. (citing Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn. 
1994)). 
 103. Id. 
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in the rear window and completed the stop nonetheless.104  The Iowa 
Court of Appeals reasoned that even though the officer was mistaken, 
“there arose no requirement that the officer act like he had never seen 
[the driver].”105 The Seventh Circuit, meanwhile, said a western 
Wisconsin trooper acted properly after pulling over a van not displaying 
a rear license plate, even though a temporary registration was affixed to 
the rear window and the officer, peering through the tinted window, 
could observe “a square cardboard with letters on it.”106 
Although Henning sets a stringent standard for law enforcement, it 
is likely that courts will scrutinize traffic stops of vehicles bearing 
special series plates closely on a case-by-case basis and may defer to 
police whenever possible.  For example, in State v. Baumann, a 2000 
case in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the stop of a 
vehicle bearing “WX” plates without reaching the constitutional issue, 
the police officer received the benefit of the doubt.107  The officer had 
overheard police-radio chatter early in his shift about a white Chevrolet 
Corsica whose driver was wanted on warrants and whose driving 
privileges had been canceled.108  Although the Chevrolet’s license plate 
number was included in the radio transmission, the officer did not recall 
the license plate number or the driver’s gender when he pulled over 
Robert Baumann’s white Chevrolet Corsica.109 
Nonetheless, the court of appeals upheld the traffic stop and rejected 
Baumann’s constitutional challenge.110  The court ruled that the stop was 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion because the stop was not 
based solely on Baumann’s “WX” plates.111  As Judge Harten reasoned, 
“[a]lthough the officer may not have been certain that the vehicle he 
stopped was the same vehicle seen earlier in the evening, this was a 
reasonable inference.  The vehicle descriptions were identical, and the 
stopped vehicle was first observed only a mile from the reported earlier 
sighting.”112  The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently refused to 
reconsider the Baumann case. 
 
 104. State v. Ross, No. 01-1840, 2003 WL 118334, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan 15, 
2003). 
 105. Id. at *2. 
 106. United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286, 288 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 107. State v. Baumann, 616 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 108. Id. at 772. 
 109. Id. at 772-73. 
 110. Id. at 772. 
 111. Id. at 774. 
 112. Id. 
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While Henning and Ascher taken together require police officers 
making a traffic stop to provide some rationale besides special series 
plates, Henning and Baumann taken together suggest that Minnesota 
appellate courts are likely to give police substantial latitude as long as 
they can provide some reasonable articulable suspicion for the traffic 
stop. 
This means that Minnesota drivers and their defense attorneys must 
push police to provide bases for all traffic stops involving special series 
license plates.  When the state fails to meet that burden, charges 
stemming from traffic stops based solely on “WX,” “WY,” or “WZ” 
plates must be dismissed.  However, once police provide grounds for the 
stop, courts are likely to defer to officers’ judgment as long as the 
grounds are at all reasonable.  That seems to shift the burden back to the 
defendant exhibiting the special plates, who is faced with proving the 
unreasonableness of a stop based on an improper lane change, a failure to 
yield, or one of a plethora of minor driving infractions that sober as well 
as drunken drivers do constantly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In State v. Henning, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a firm 
stance in favor of the “reasonable articulable suspicion” standard.  The 
court made it clear that constitutional rules apply even during stops of 
vehicles with special series license plates, which are issued chiefly to 
repeat drunken drivers.  However, when Henning is viewed in light of 
other recent Minnesota appellate cases, it seems clear that courts are 
poised to give police the benefit of the doubt as long as the officers can 
provide some reasonable reason for stopping a vehicle besides the 
presence of the special plates. 
In theory, the Minnesota Supreme Court has reached a workable 
balance between targeting repeated drunken drivers and ensuring 
citizens’ constitutional rights.  Now, the challenge will be in ensuring 
that theory translates into practice, lest those special license-plate letters 
“WX,” “WY,” and “WZ” take on an uncomfortable, and perhaps 
unconstitutional, scarlet tinge. 
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